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Abstract

Plans to prepare for a global pandemic have proliferated in recent years, and “legal preparedness” has emerged
as a critical component of such plans. Commonly, the threat of disease is analogized to terrorism and recast as
an issue of national security. In this framing, laws authorizing surveillance, containment, and forced treatment
are understood as necessary. Law’s promise of protection against abuses in the exercise of such powers
through procedural rights of review offers meagre comfort for critics concerned that individual liberties will
readily yield to national security and public health in the context of an actual pandemic. An alternative framing
shifts the focus to marginalized populations and existing disparities that account for the markedly disparate
impacts of disasters. In shifting the frame, a broader conceptualization of law’s role emerges, one in which the
redistribution of the burden of pandemics and access to the social determinants of health become central.
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Accessing Justice Amid Threats of
Contagion

JANET E MOSHER*
Plans to prepare for a global pandemic have proliferated in recent years, and “legal
preparedness” has emerged as a critical component of such plans. Commonly, the threat
of disease is analogized to terrorism and recast as an issue of national security. In this
framing, laws authorizing surveillance, containment, and forced treatment are understood
as necessary. Law’s promise of protection against abuses in the exercise of such powers
through procedural rights of review offers meagre comfort for critics concerned that
individual liberties will readily yield to national security and public health in the context of
an actual pandemic. An alternative framing shifts the focus to marginalized populations and
existing disparities that account for the markedly disparate impacts of disasters. In shifting
the frame, a broader conceptualization of law’s role emerges, one in which the redistribution
of the burden of pandemics and access to the social determinants of health become central.
&HVGHUQL«UHVDQQ¬HVRQDEHDXFRXSSODQLé¬ODSU¬SDUDWLRQ£XQHSDQG¬PLHPRQGLDOHHWOD
mSU¬SDUDWLRQMXULGLTXH~FRQVWLWXHXQ¬O¬PHQWFULWLTXHGHVFHWWHSODQLéFDWLRQ2QDVVRFLH
FRPPXQ¬PHQWODPHQDFHGÙ¬SLG¬PLH£XQHIRUPHGHWHUURULVPHHWRQHQIDLWYRORQWLHUVXQH
question de sécurité nationale. Dans ce contexte, on met rarement en doute la nécessité

*

This article derives from two research projects on pandemic planning and homelessness in
which I was a co-investigator (principal investigator, Professor Stephen Gaetz). The two
projects, Responding to H1N1 in the Context of Homelessness in Canada and Understanding
Pandemic Preparedness within the Context of the Canadian Homelessness Crisis, involved several
academics, and included interviews and surveys of people experiencing homelessness, as
well as service providers and public health officials in four Canadian cities. In this article I
draw upon the data derived from the Toronto component of the projects. The funding for
these research projects from the Canadian Institute for Health Research (CIHR) is gratefully
acknowledged. An earlier version of this article was originally presented at the Symposium in
Honour of John McCamus: Scholarship, Teaching and Leadership (7 February 2013), hosted
at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
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GHORLVDXWRULVDQWODVXUYHLOODQFHOHFRQéQHPHQWHWOÙREOLJDWLRQGHWUDLWHPHQW/DJDUDQWLH
de protection qu’offre la loi contre les abus dans l’exercice de ces pouvoirs, par le biais du
droit de recours en révision des procédés, offre peu de réconfort aux critiques qui redoutent
que les libertés individuelles ne cèdent le pas aux intérêts de la sécurité nationale et de la
santé publique advenant une véritable pandémie. Un changement de contexte réoriente les
projecteurs vers des populations marginalisées et les disparités actuelles qui expliquent
les effets fort disparates des désastres. Ce déplacement des projecteurs fait apparaître une
plus vaste conceptualisation du rôle de la loi, dans laquelle une redistribution du fardeau des
pandémies et l’accès aux déterminants sociaux de la santé prennent le haut du pavé.
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WHILE PLANS FOR THE CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL of new and potentially

deadly pathogens have long existed, pandemic planning and preparedness efforts
proliferated rapidly after the outbreak of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome)
in 2003, the emergence of the looming threat of H5N1 (avian influenza), and
the declaration by the World Health Organization of an H1N1 (swine flu)
pandemic in 2009. The projection of 62 million deaths and devastating economic
consequences arising from the next influenza pandemic is frequently cited.1
Importantly, plans to respond to the worrisome possibility of a global influenza
pandemic have been developed in an environment significantly influenced by
the events of 9/11 and subsequent anthrax attacks in the United States. “Legal
preparedness,” understood as the enactment of the necessary constellation
of law and legal authority, has emerged as a critical component of pandemic
preparedness. Yet, this description invites the question of precisely what laws are
1.

Editorial, “Swine Influenza: how much of a global threat” (2009) 373:9674 The Lancet
1495 (citing Christopher Murray and colleagues who used data from the 1918-20 Spanish
influenza pandemic as the basis for this prediction). Others predict that the number of deaths
globally will be as high as 369 million. See Lawrence O Gostin & Benjamin E Berkman,
“Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the Public’s Health” (2007) 59:1 Admin L Rev 121 at
125.
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indeed necessary—a question that can only be answered by interrogating more
closely how the threat is conceptualized and who is understood to be threatened.
Pervasive in the pandemic planning literature is an analogy between
contagious disease and terrorism; between the individual carrier of disease and
the terrorist intent on destruction. Both are depicted as threats to national
security, and best managed through surveillance, borders, containment, and
control.2 Given the stark threat posed by contagious disease in the context of an
environment depicted as increasingly risky, the role of law is first and foremost to
confer sufficient legal authority upon public health officials (aided by police where
necessary) to engage in surveillance, apprehend and detain carriers or suspected
carriers of disease (that is, to quarantine or isolate), and compel treatment. While
not criminal law per se (although certainly some commentators have argued for
the expansion of criminal law powers to respond to pandemics),3 this approach
shares many features of the law-and-order framework that has dominated
neo-liberal governance. The approach positions public health in opposition to
individual rights to privacy, liberty, and security of the person, and accepts that
infringement of the latter is justified to secure the former. In keeping with other
laws enacted in the name of national security, the curtailment of the rights of
some promises safety and security for others.4
As one might anticipate, this approach to pandemic planning has evoked
critical responses from civil libertarians, who rightly worry that in a climate of
fear and where national security is understood to be threatened, the curtailment
of individual liberties will almost invariably be seen as justified.5 Assurances that
voluntary compliance and individual responsibility will be widespread, that

2.

3.
4.
5.

Wendy Mariner, George Annas, and Wendy E Parmet draw upon Priscilla Wald’s work in
their description of this response as an “outbreak narrative.” People with contagious diseases
are characterized as a threat to society, and the threat is countered by giving scientists control,
which includes the authority to monitor and manage people, and requires people to obey
strict regimens of isolation or treatment. See Wendy K Mariner, George J Annas & Wendy E
Parmet, “Pandemic Preparedness: A Return to the Rule of Law” (2009) 1:2 Drexel L Rev 341
at 359 [Mariner, Annas & Parmet, “Rule of Law”], citing Priscilla Wald, Contagious: Cultures,
Carriers and the Outbreak of Narrative (Durham NC: Duke University, 2008).
See e.g. Amir Attaran & Kumanan Wilson, “A Legal and Epidemiological Justification for
Federal Authority in Public Health Emergencies” (2007) 52:2 McGill LJ 381.
Stephen J Toope, “Fallout from ‘9-11’: Will a Security Culture Undermine Human Rights?”
(2002) 65:2 Sask L Rev 281.
See e.g. George J Annas, Wendy K Mariner & Wendy E Parmet, Pandemic Preparedness: The
Need for a Public Health – Not a Law Enforcement/National Security – Approach (American
Civil Liberties Union, 2008), online: <http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/pemic_report.pdf>
[Annas, Mariner & Parmet, Public Health].
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compulsion will be rare and invoked only when necessary, and that procedural
rights of review will guard against abuses of power, for reasons elaborated below
in Part I.C, do little to placate these worries.
Yet, a more fundamental critique of the conceptualization of pandemics as
national security threats directs attention to the question of who, precisely, is
the subject of the promised safety and security. Critical purchase on this issue is
grounded in the lived realities of those persons and groups who experience social
marginalization.6 In what follows I turn to the experiences of persons who are
homeless in order to delineate the differential and harmful impact of approaching
pandemics as a matter of national security.7 To develop this analysis I draw from
accounts of past pandemics and disasters as well as from recent empirical research
into the experiences of homeless individuals in Toronto during the H1N1
pandemic, including their access to information about the pandemic, to vaccines,
and to trusted medical personnel. With limited ability to stockpile resources,
self-quarantine, or follow public health advice on preventative measures such as
hand washing, those who are homeless are among the least likely to be in a position
to comply voluntarily with public health edicts. This reality renders the homeless
particularly vulnerable to coercive state action, especially when considered
together with the possibility that the stereotyping and social stigmatization of
homeless people may mark them as vectors of disease. Moreover, there is good
reason to conjecture that procedures for judicial review of coercive state action
will be of limited assistance to most people in the context of an actual pandemic,
and of virtually no assistance to the homeless. The law-and-order/containment
approach arguably promises more harm than good for those who are homeless.

6.

7.

I use “marginalization” in the sense articulated by Iris Marion Young to capture the social
processes that exclude members of particular social groups from, or limit their participation
in, economic, political and social spheres. Processes of marginalization result not only in
material deprivation but, as Young argues, deprivation of the rights and freedoms others
enjoy, the denial of opportunities to develop and exercise capacities, and the erosion of
dignity. See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990) at 53-55.
There is currently no accepted pan-Canadian definition of homelessness. The Canadian
Homelessness Research Network (CHRN) has developed a useful definition and topology
that importantly moves beyond only those who are visibly homeless on the streets or
utilizing emergency shelters. A broader definition is particularly important to capture
women’s homelessness; given the violence women face on the streets and concerns to
retain custody of their children, women’s homelessness is far less visible than men’s. For the
CHRN’s definition, see Canadian Homelessness Research Network, “Canadian Definition
of Homelessness” The Homeless Hub, online: <http://www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/
files/06122012CHRNhomelessdefinition.pdf>.
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Attention to marginalized populations exposes additional flaws in the
pandemics-as-national-security frame, and suggests an alternative approach
grounded in principles of social justice. Shifting the focus from abstracted,
undifferentiated individuals to marginalized individuals and groups makes
it abundantly clear that social, economic, and geographic position matters
enormously in the distribution of the burdens of pandemics and of the benefits of
medical and non-medical countermeasures. It exposes the reality that those who
are most socially vulnerable are likely to bear the greatest burdens of a pandemic.
The homeless, given already compromised health and living conditions conducive
to the spread of disease (for example, over-crowding, poor ventilation, and limited
access to running water), are at greater risk of acquiring a communicable disease.8
They have the fewest resources to protect themselves (including access to housing,
food, information, and health care), and little capacity to shoulder the social and
economic impact of measures such as quarantine. Countless historical (and indeed
contemporary) examples demonstrate that pandemics are not equal opportunity
events. Social vulnerability increases the likelihood of disease acquisition, reduces
access to both medical and non-medical forms of remediation, and tightens the
grip of morbidity and mortality. In virtually all forms of disasters and emergencies,
marginalized groups, both globally and domestically, bear the largest burden, yet
they continue to be routinely overlooked in pandemic plans.9 Unless attention
is paid to social vulnerability in pandemic planning, such plans are likely to not
only replicate, but exacerbate, existing inequality and deepen social injustices.
The national security frame positions the “nation” as under threat, obscuring the
reality that the likelihood and severity of the threat materializing depends very
much on one’s social location.
Approaching pandemic planning with those who experience social
marginalization clearly in view also prompts a shift in temporal focus. The national
8.
9.

Cheryl S Leung et al, “Homelessness and the Response to Emerging Infectious Disease
Outbreaks: Lessons From SARS” (2008) 85:3 J Urban Health 402.
While not a pandemic, the current outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa makes
clear the critical role inequality plays not only in the acquisition and spread of disease,
but in explaining the little attention Ebola has garnered since its first outbreak in 1976.
Ebola is spread through close contact with the blood or body fluids of an infected person.
Inadequate infection control in rural hospitals, and more broadly an under-resourced
health care infrastructure, have been blamed, in part, for the spread of the disease; see Ian
Kerridge & Lyn Gilbert, “Epidemic ethics: four lessons from the current Ebola outbreak”
The Conversation (24 August 2014), online: < http://theconversation.com/epidemic-ethicsfour-lessons-from-the-current-ebola-outbreak-30534>; Lawrence O Gostin, Daniel Lucey &
Alexandra Phelan, “The Ebola Epidemic: A Global Health Emergency” (2014) 312:11 JAMA
1095 at 1095-96.
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security approach to pandemic planning is temporally concentrated upon the
moment of crisis—that is, upon the containment and treatment of those exposed
to disease. Here too, foregrounding the needs and experiences of the homeless
exposes the limitations of this gaze. Rather the gaze must be expanded outwards
to the pre-crisis period—to the long haul—and to the necessity of building trust,
and the capacity to fulfil the social determinants of health.
Finally, an approach to pandemic planning that takes the needs and
experiences of socially marginalized populations seriously prompts us to think
anew about the nature of the rights at stake, the ethical values that ought to guide
decision-making, and our choices about the role of law. Without a doubt, rights
to privacy, liberty, and security of the person (usually defined in negative terms,
as limits on the state) are implicated by current approaches. But consideration
of the needs and experiences of marginalized populations suggests that a positive
conception of rights—for example, of the right to health—might serve us all
much better in preparing for and responding to a pandemic. It also stresses
engagement with law’s role in furthering a substantive vision of social justice.
It moves us beyond procedural justice—that is, beyond rights of review to test
the balancing of individual rights and public health—and indeed beyond the
coercive power of law. It moves our attention from national security to the role of
law in securing social justice.

I. PANDEMICS AS A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT
Many commentators have documented the emergence of a new paradigm in
which public health emergencies and public health policy more broadly are
filtered through “the prism of national security and law enforcement.”10 A prism
of precisely this sort is found in Canada’s 2004 National Security Policy, the
Executive Summary of which cautions:

10. Annas, Mariner & Parmet, Public Health, supra note 5 at 5. They also note that “President
Bush’s first suggestion to contain a bird flu pandemic was to call in the military to quarantine
large sections of the United States” (ibid at 8). Gostin and Berkman describe how, in the
United States, H5N1 was regarded by policy makers as a threat to national security (supra
note 1 at 123). Benjamin and Mouton suggest that “public health emergencies are now
seen under the intense spotlight of national security concerns.” See Georges C Benjamin &
Anthony D Moulton, “Public Health Legal Preparedness: A Framework for Action” (2008)
36:1 JL Med & Ethics 13 at 13 [Benjamin & Moulton, “Public Health”]. Selgelid references
the World Health Organization’s description of pandemic influenza as “the most feared
security threat.” See MJ Selgelid, “Pandethics” (2009) 123:3 Pub Health 255 at 255.
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But as all Canadians know, we live in an increasingly interconnected, complex
and often dangerous world. The increase in terrorist acts and the threat of rapid,
globalized spread of infectious disease all challenge our society and the sense of
security that is so critical to our quality of life. Canadians understand this new
reality.11

The Policy continues:
Terrorism is a global challenge that has been recognized by the United Nations as a
crime against humanity. Canada is not immune to this threat.
But the threats we face are not limited to terrorism. The SARS (severe acute respiratory
syndrome) outbreak demonstrated the power of individuals to unintentionally
transmit threats around the globe at the speed of air travel.
The Government is determined to pursue our national security interests and to
be relentless in the protection of our sovereignty and our society in the face of
these new threats.12
…
The world is a dangerous place, even if the relative safety of life in Canada
sometimes obscures just how dangerous it is. As recent events have highlighted,
there is a wide range of threats facing Canada from pandemics to terrorism. These
threats can have a serious impact on the safety of Canadians and on the effective
functioning of our society.13

The Policy renders the risky and threatening environment as taken for
granted, a matter of common sense, and cautions the reader not to be lulled into
11. Government of Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (Privy
Council Office, 2004) at vii, online: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/information/
publications/aarchives/natsec-secnat/natsec-secnat-eng.pdf> [Government of Canada, Open
Society].
12. Ibid at 1. The various threats identified are terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, failing states, foreign espionage, natural disasters, critical infrastructure
vulnerability, organized crime, and pandemics. In Chapter 5, which addresses public health,
the context is described as follows:
A robust public health system is a critical line of defence in protecting Canadians against
many current and emerging threats, including contamination of our food and water, major
disease outbreaks such as SARS, natural disasters, major accidents like chemical spills, and
even the terrorist threat of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack. The complex,
multijurisdictional nature of such threats also speaks to the necessity for Canada’s approach
to public health emergencies to be more than strictly local or national in its orientation,
and to proactively contribute to the building of a more resilient international public health
architecture.

Ibid at 29.
13. Ibid at 6.
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complacency by the relative safety we may, in fact, temporarily experience. The
Policy depicts the environment as equally risky for all. In their portrayal of that
risky environment the authors of the Policy collapse acts of terrorism, failing
states, foreign espionage, natural disasters, organized crime, critical infrastructure
vulnerability, the proliferation of weapons, and pandemics into a singular
“all-hazards approach,” and then locate these threats within a framework of
national security.14 More broadly still, the Policy calls for the continuous inclusion
of “the public health dimension in the ongoing national security debate.”15
While the physical borders of the nation state are certainly important in
this account (one need think only of the airport surveillance of passengers’ body
temperatures during the SARS crisis), the relevant borders are also internal.
Quarantine and isolation—the power to construct internal borders to seal off
and contain those infected or exposed to disease—have emerged as critical tools
in the legal preparedness toolkit.16 Individuals carrying disease, or indeed even
exposed to disease, can be apprehended, detained, and treated without consent.
They are explicitly recast within Canada’s national security policy as threats to
Canada’s sovereignty, and as persons against whom the state must act in order to
secure the life, liberty, and security of Canadians.
This approach has been operationalized in a variety of ways, but significantly
through the framework of legal preparedness. As the post-SARS Commission
of Inquiry chaired by Justice Archie Campbell (the “Campbell Commission”)
observed, legal preparedness has increasingly come to be viewed as a critical
14. This all-hazards approach has been described and critiqued by a number of American and
Canadian authors. For examples in the Canadian context, see Estair Van Wagner, “The
practice of biosecurity in Canada: public health legal preparedness and Toronto’s SARS crisis”
(2008) 40:7 Environment and Planning A 1647 at 1649. For examples in the American
context, see Mariner, Annas & Parmet, “Rule of Law,” supra note 2; Brian Kamoie et al,
“Assessing Laws and Legal Authorities for Public Health Emergency Legal Preparedness”
(2008) 36:1 JL Med & Ethics 23. In this all-hazards approach “no matter what happens …
a law enforcement/national security approach is required” (Canadian Homelessness Research
Network, supra note 7 at 16).
15. Government of Canada, Open Society, supra note 11 at 29.
16. The terms quarantine and isolation are not used consistently in the cited literature. I use the
terms in a manner consistent with the definitions offered by the World Health Organization:
isolation is defined as “the separation, for the period of communicability, of infected persons”;
quarantine as “the restriction of the movement of healthy persons who have been exposed to a
suspected or confirmed case of infection with a highly communicable disease during the likely
infectious period”; and social distancing to include “a range of community-based measures
to reduce contact between people (e.g., closing schools or prohibiting large gatherings).” See
the World Health Organization, Ethical considerations in developing a public health response to
pandemic influenza (World Health Organization, 2007) at vi.
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component of public health preparedness.17 The definition of legal preparedness
first developed in 2003 by Moulton et al as “the attainment by a public health
system … of specified legal benchmarks or standards essential to the preparedness
of that system”18 has been widely adopted, as has their elaboration of its four core
elements.
1. The creation of laws and legal authorities conferring necessary
powers on various levels of government and in particular, on public
health officials;
2. Competency in using these laws effectively (competencies of public
health professionals, among others, to know when and how to
apply their legal powers);
3. The coordination of legally based interventions across jurisdictions
(horizontally and vertically) and sectors; and
4. The sharing of information about public health laws and best
practices.19
While in theory the concept of legal preparedness leaves open a multiplicity
of possibilities for the sorts of laws one might argue are warranted to prepare
for a pandemic, legal preparedness has generally been taken up in a manner in

17. An independent Commission was established by the Government of Ontario to investigate
the introduction and spread of SARS. Justice Archie Campbell of the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice was appointed Commissioner. The Commission released three reports,
totaling some 1500 pages and published in five volumes. Throughout this article, I focus
on the Second Interim Report: SARS and Public Health Legislation. Government of Ontario,
The SARS Commission, Second Interim Report: SARS and Public Health Legislation, Volume
5 (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2005) at 344, online <http://www.
archives.gov.on.ca/en/e_records/sars/report/index.html> [Campbell Commission].
18. Benjamin & Moulton, “Public Health,” supra note 10 at 14. See also AD Moulton et al,
“What is Public Health Legal Preparedness?” (2003) 31:4 JL Med & Ethics 672 [Moulton
et al, “Legal Preparedness”]; Demetrios L Kouzoukas, “Public Health Emergency Legal
Preparedness: Legal Practitioner Perspectives” (2008) 36:1 JL Med & Ethics 18.
19. Benjamin & Moulton, “Public Health,” supra note 10 at 14. See also Moulton et al, “Legal
Preparedness,” supra note 18; Kouzoukas, supra note 18.
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keeping with the national security account.20 In practice, what one sees is the call
for—and in many jurisdictions the adoption of—legal frameworks that expand
the ground for disease surveillance, the control of movement through quarantine,
isolation, and other social distancing measures, and forced assessment and
treatment.21 A brief overview of Ontario’s Health Protection and Promotion Act
(HPPA) elucidates the nature of the powers granted to public health officials
to control the movement and behaviours of persons infected, or assumed to be
infected, with a communicable disease.22
A. ONTARIO’S LEGISLATIVE REGIME

Pursuant to subsection 22(1) of the HPPA, a Medical Officer of Health (MOH)
may, by written order, “require a person to take or to refrain from taking any
action that is specified in the order in respect of a communicable disease”
(communicable diseases are identified by regulation).23 Section 22 orders, as they
are known, may be issued if an MOH believes, upon reasonable and probable
grounds,
a. that a communicable disease exists or may exist or that there is an
immediate risk of an outbreak of a communicable disease in the
health unit served by the medical officer of health;

20. Kouzoukas, supra note 18 at 18-19. Kouzoukas, Deputy General Counsel in the United
States Department of Health and Human Services, identifies the first element as the
“central, substantive aspect of public health legal preparedness” and notes that the need for
additional federal laws in the United States to respond to the threats of bioterrorism and
pandemics led to the passage of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006; the
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2006 and the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002. Similarly, in the Canadian context, Attaran
and Wilson make an argument for the need for a greater role of the federal government in
the management of pandemics. In both Canada and the United States, issues of the scope of
federal jurisdiction are debated. Attaran and Wilson suggest that the federal head of power
under the Constitution in relation to quarantine has been read far too narrowly, limiting the
role of the federal government solely to the regulation of national borders. They advance a
further argument grounding increased federal jurisdiction in regulating pandemics within the
federal criminal law power. See Attaran & Wilson, supra note 3.
21. Authority to detain and treat does not exhaust the role envisioned for law; jurisdictional
clarity (within and between nations), surveillance, and patenting have also received attention
within the national security framework.
22. RSO 1990, c H7 [HPPA].
23. Ibid, s 22(1). Boards of health in Ontario are municipally based and each has a medical
officer of health.
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b. that the communicable disease presents a risk to the health of
persons in the health unit served by the medical officer of health;
and
c. that the requirements specified in the order are necessary in
order to decrease or eliminate the risk to health presented by the
communicable disease.24
Such orders may require, amongst other things, that a person who “has or
may have a communicable disease or is or may be infected with an agent of a
communicable disease” isolate himself or herself; submit to an examination by a
physician; conduct himself or herself in such a manner as to not expose another
person to infection; and where the disease is identified by regulation as virulent,
place himself or herself under the care and treatment of a physician.25
A significant reform introduced in Ontario between the first and second
wave of SARS cases in 2003 was the expansion of the power of a MOH to direct
an order against a class of persons.26 The HPPA provides no definition of “class”
and, consequently, a MOH retains broad powers to determine the contours of
the class that constitutes the subject of the order. If notice to members of the class
is likely to cause delay that “may significantly increase the risk to the health of
any person,” notice may be given through “any communications media” deemed
appropriate by a MOH, although the MOH must post the order at an address or
addresses where it is most likely to be brought to the attention of the members
of the class.27
A person who is the subject of a section 22 order is entitled to a hearing
before the Health Services and Appeal Board established under the Ministry of
Health and Long-Term Care Appeal and Review Boards Act, 1998.28 A request for
a hearing must be made in writing within fifteen days of notice of the order, and
the Board must hold a hearing within a further fifteen days. An appeal is available
to the Divisional Court, from where yet another appeal is available by leave to
the Court of Appeal. Although the Appeal Board may stay an order pending its
decision, this is a matter of discretion.29
An entirely different procedural route exists should a MOH wish to take steps
to enforce an order he or she has issued. The MOH must apply to the Ontario

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Ibid, s 22(2) [emphasis added].
Ibid, s 22(4).
Ibid, s 22(5.0.1).
Ibid, s 22(5.0.2), 22(5.0.3).
SO 1998, c 18, Schedule H.
HPPA, supra note 22, s 44.
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Court of Justice, seeking an order pursuant to section 35 requiring a person to
isolate himself or herself, submit to an examination by a physician, place himself
or herself under the care and treatment of a physician, and/or conduct himself
or herself in a manner that avoids exposing other persons to infection.30 The
coercive powers of the court include the potential to order that a person be taken
into custody, admitted and detained in a hospital or “other appropriate facility,”
(a provision added during SARS) and be examined and treated for a period of up
to six months (which may be extended, on motion, for further periods, each of
not greater than six months).31 A section 35 order may be directed to any police
force in Ontario for enforcement.32 An appeal of a section 35 order to the Court
of Appeal is restricted to questions of law alone and subject to a “special leave”
requirement that the circumstances of the case are such that it is “essential in the
public interest or for the due administration of justice that leave be granted.”33
B. JUSTIFYING LIMITS ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Significantly, section 22 and 35 orders override provisions of the Health Care
Consent Act,34 which would otherwise require consent to an examination
by a physician and to treatment.35 Needless to say, orders requiring isolation,
submission to a medical examination without consent, or detention for
treatment (again absent consent) reflect the exercise of extraordinary state
powers. The circumstances in which infringements of rights may be justifiable in
order to protect public health is a much debated issue. In the Canadian context,
limitations on Charter protected rights, such as liberty and security of the person,
are scrutinized under section 1 to determine whether they are reasonable and
demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.36 Without embarking
on that analysis here, it is nevertheless important to note two sources that might
usefully guide such an analysis in the context of a pandemic, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Siracusa Principles, a set
30. Ibid, s 35(2).
31. Ibid, ss 35(3), 35(4), 35(5), 35(7), 35(11). Prior to SARS the HPPA referred only to
hospitals.
32. HPPA, supra note 22, s 35(6). Prior to an amendment in 2007, the order was only
enforceable by the police force in the health unit of the Ministry of Health.
33. Ibid, s 35(18), 35(19).
34. SO 1996, c 2, Schedule A.
35. HPPA, supra note 22, s 102(3).
36. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. See e.g. Nola M Ries, “Quarantine
and the Law: The 2003 SARS Experience in Canada (A New Disease Calls on Old Public
Health Tools)” (2005) 43:2 Alta L Rev 529.
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of non-binding guides to the interpretation of the limitation clauses contained in
the ICCPR.37 While no derogation is permitted of particular rights (for example,
to life or to freedom from torture and slavery) the ICCPR contains both a
general derogation clause related to public emergencies (Article 4) and specific
provisions regarding limitations on specified rights in order to protect, among
other interests, public health.38 Article 4 requires that the public emergency be of
a nature that “threatens the life of the nation,” the emergency must be officially
proclaimed, and the measures taken must be “strictly necessary” and must “not
involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion
or social origin.” In addition, a state taking such measures is obligated to inform
other states parties to the Convention.
Informed by the interpretive guidelines provided by the Siracusa Principles,
the derogation of rights guaranteed by the ICCPR in order to protect public
health is commonly understood to require that restrictions be provided for and
carried out in accordance with law, directed towards a legitimate objective of
general interest, strictly necessary to achieve the objective, based on scientific
evidence, the least intrusive or restrictive means available, neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, of limited duration, respectful of human dignity, and subject to
review.39
37. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS
171, Can TS 1976 No 47 6 ILM 368 [ICCPR]; UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and
Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNESC,
41st Sess, Annex, Agenda Item 18, UN Doc E/CN4/1984/4 (1984). The Siracusa Principles
were developed during a meeting of international experts in Siracusa, Italy in 1984 and
subsequently adopted by the United Nations Economic and Social Council. Although
a non-binding set of interpretive principles, they are widely referenced in the academic
literature and in international jurisprudence. Note that Canada is a signatory to the
Covenant.
38. Limitations of the rights to freedom of movement and to leave one’s country, to peaceful
assembly, to association, and to manifest one’s freedom of religion and of conscience in order
to protect public health are all recognized. While the provisions vary somewhat, common
features are the requirement that such limitations be provided by law, are necessary in order
to protect public health, and are consistent with other rights recognized by the Covenant.
ICCPR, supra note 37 at arts 12, 18, 19, 21, 22.
39. WHO, “Ethical Considerations,” supra note 16 at 9. In the context of the current outbreak
of the Ebola virus and the mass quarantine of the West Point slum in Liberia arguably
none of these conditions have been satisfied. The quarantine, originally to last for 21 days,
ended after 10 days of escalating protest, violence and food scarcity and likely did more to
spread the virus than to contain it; see Mark A Rothstein, “From SARS to Ebola: Legal and
Ethical Considerations for Modern Quarantine” (2015) 12:1 Indiana Health Law Review
(forthcoming).
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More particularly, in the context of a pandemic, these principles require
clear and convincing evidence that the person whose rights are to be curtailed is
infected with a contagious disease (or at a minimum, is reasonably suspected of
being infected) and poses a demonstrable threat to others; that the intervention
is an effective means of combating the public health threat; that the burden is
proportionate to the expected benefit; that the measure is the least restrictive of the
options available; and that the measure is applied in a non-discriminatory manner.40
Difficult questions will no doubt arise in the application of these principles
to an actual pandemic, particularly in the context of an emerging disease about
which little is known. How effectiveness is understood and operationalized will be
important. In relation to isolation and quarantine in particular, one might insist
upon scientific evidence demonstrating that the disease is contagious and that
isolation and/or quarantine stand a “reasonable scientific chance of substantially
diminishing the spread of disease.”41 But as Bensimon and Upshur caution, the
effectiveness of quarantine “depends as much on evidence from epidemiological
studies as it does on explicitly identifying and addressing the preferences and
cultural commitments of affected and involved communities.”42
The importance of considering the role of social, economic, and cultural
factors in assessing the efficacy of quarantine and social distancing measures
is underscored by the experience of SARS in Ontario. There is considerable
post-SARS evidence of the tremendous challenges even relatively well-resourced
people faced in maintaining quarantine. Reynolds et al surveyed some 1057
people who had experienced quarantine in Toronto during SARS. Compliance
with quarantine behaviours varied from 50.4 per cent (use of mask when other
household members were present) to 99.4 per cent (did not go out of the house to

40. Gostin & Berkman, supra note 1 at 146-48. The World Health Organization’s ethical
guidelines on pandemic planning provide that “public health measures that involve
significant costs and/or burdens should be reserved for situations where they can be
reasonably expected to make a difference to the consequences of a pandemic.” WHO,
“Ethical Considerations,” supra note 16 at 3.
41. See Cécile M Bensimon & Ross EG Upshur, “Evidence and Effectiveness in Decisionmaking
for Quarantine” (2007) 97:1 Am J Pub Health S44 at S46.
42. Ibid at S47-S48.
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socialize).43 The proportion reporting compliance with all household protective
measures was 38.4 per cent, and with all community protective measures 54.1
per cent. Quarantine also came with costs, both financial (although the Ontario
and federal governments later introduced financial compensation that partially
addressed this issue) and health (symptoms of depression and posttraumatic stress
disorder were commonly reported). The data on compliance led Reynolds et al
to contemplate the need for the expansion of coercive measures to shore up the
effectiveness of quarantine, including quarantine facilities, compliance hotlines,
and the immediate issuance of legal orders.44 This suggestion for an escalation
in measures of compliance enforcement is particularly troubling in light of the
widely shared medical view that quarantine and isolation will be of limited utility
in controlling the transmission of the flu virus.45 Escalating compliance measures
are rendered all the more concerning by the possibility that, because quarantine
creates the impression that the state is actively pursuing the public’s health, its use
may be driven by its political, rather than scientific, value.46
But beyond this concern, assessments of what actions are necessary—and of
what restrictions on various rights are justified—are substantially impacted by
perceptions of risk, and these perceptions are often anything but evidence-based.
43. DL Reynolds et al, “Understanding, compliance and psychological impact of the SARS
quarantine experience” (2008) 136:7 Epidemiology & Infection 997. See also Laura
Hawryluck et al, “SARS Control and Psychological Effects of Quarantine, Toronto, Canada”
(2004) 10:7 Emerging Infectious Diseases 1206. The latter study involved a survey of
129 persons quarantined in Toronto during SARS. As many as 50 per cent felt they had
not received adequate information about infection control, and, as in the Reynolds study,
compliance rates varied. As a further consideration, Ries notes the challenge of locating the
contacts of those infected; of the twenty-three thousand people who were contacts of SARS
patients, approximately nine thousand could not be reached or were only reached after the
ten day quarantine period had passed. Ries, supra note 36 at 544.
44. Reynolds et al, supra note 43 at 1003-04. In Singapore and Hong Kong, measures to enforce
compliance were much stronger and more coercive than in Toronto and included cordoning
off buildings, electronic monitoring and the use of surveillance cameras.
45. Gostin & Berkman, supra note 1 at 171. In a recent editorial, Richard Schabas (Ontario’s
chief medical officer of health from 1987-1997) and Neil Rua had this to say about
quarantine: “Quarantine didn’t help control SARS and it won’t help control Ebola. Because
of fear of Ebola, whole areas of West Africa are being cordoned off and airlines are cancelling
services. These are forms of quarantine. They will hinder the flow of aid without stopping
the disease’s spread.” Richard Schabas & Neil Rau, “Ebola: Can we learn from SARS?” The
Globe and Mail (27 August 2014), online: < http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/
ebola-can-we-learn-from-sars/article20211486/>.
46. Joshua P Garoon & Patrick S Duggan, “Discourses of disease, discourses of disadvantage: A
critical analysis of National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plans” (2008) 67:7 Soc Sci &
Med 1133 at 1136.
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As Parmet has argued, disease is not only biological, but social and political; as
such, the level of fear may have little to do with actual lethality or incidence.
She maintains that especially as contagious disease has become less common in
developed countries, the fear of such diseases those of us living in such countries
experience has increased.47 Pandemics, by definition, are global outbreaks
caused by a strain of virus not already known to be circulating in the human
population. The unknown quality of the virus (how it is transmitted, and its
impact on morbidity and mortality), the absence of immunity in the population,
and the unavailability of vaccines combine with anxieties related to global travel
and trade to render pandemics particularly threatening in the Western public
imagination. The intensity of this fear creates pressure for state action, which
frequently takes the form of strong social controls and, occasionally, extreme
measures. By contrast, Parmet points out, “common and deadly diseases, such as
childhood diarrhea or cardiovascular disease, elicit little concern and frequently
are met with neglect by state officials.”48
Sunstein offers important insights into our perception of risk, delineating
two potential sources of error at play when public fear leads to support for the
erosion of civil liberties. He calls one error the “availability heuristic” to capture
the potential of salient incidents (i.e., incidents that stand out due to vivid imagery
or recent occurrence) to generate an exaggerated sense of risk.49 If the harm is
easily imagined, public demand for state action increases, leading to potentially
excessive precautions. If not easily imagined, the risk may be neglected.50 He also
points to the role of “availability entrepreneurs” who actively “drive public fear in
their preferred directions.”51 The second error is “probability neglect,” where focus
is directed to the worst-case scenario, regardless of how likely it is to happen.52
Sunstein and Parmet both identify the important role of the media in the
construction of risk and fear. As Sunstein argues, “[m]any perceived “epidemics”
47. Wendy E Parmet, “Public Health & Social Control: Implications for Human Rights,”
The International Council on Human Rights Policy’s Project on Social Control and Human
Rights Research Paper (2009) at 11, online: < http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/173/
public_health_and_social_control_wendy_parmet.pdf> [Parmet, “Public Health & Social
Control”].
48. Ibid. A similar point has been made about the Ebola virus: In the same time period that
the Ebola virus is estimated to have caused 1,000 deaths, malaria is estimated to have killed
300,000, and tuberculosis is estimated to have killed 600,000. See Kerridge and Gilbert,
supra note 9.
49. Cass R Sunstein, “Fear and Liberty” (2004) 71:4 Soc Research 967 at 969.
50. Ibid at 970.
51. Ibid at 970.
52. Ibid at 971.

MOSHER, ACCESSING JUSTICE AMID THREATS OF CONTAGION 935

are in reality no such thing, but instead a product of media coverage of gripping,
unrepresentative incidents.”53 Indeed the whipping up of fear and of concerns
about safety is a common technique of governance.54 The expanding reach of
criminal law, the recent proliferation of mandatory minimum sentences, and the
creation of quasi-criminal “safe streets” legislation and by-laws, for example, have
all been justified by “claims-makers” or availability entrepreneurs as necessary
for the safety and protection of the public (or more aptly, some members of
the public).55 Claims of threats to safety, rather than empirical data, have
propelled these reforms. With the production of fear comes increased demand for
government action and the very real possibility of disproportionate responses and
unnecessary curtailment of civil liberties.56 Fear, as Gagnon, Jacob, and Holmes
maintain, is inherently political, invoked by the state as a tool of governance. They
suggest that fear is invoked in public health campaigns (they examine campaigns
regarding sexually transmitted diseases in particular) as a “strategy to create a state
of permanent (in)security and manipulate people into becoming calculating,
rational and self-interested subjects who avoid the perils of human desires and
contagion.”57 In summary, there is good reason to think that assessments of the
measures considered strictly necessary to protect public health may be driven
more by fear and political expediency than by science.
Another set of questions concerns who will most likely be affected and
how readily their rights, in particular, might be ignored. In the “preparedness”
environment, responsibility is seen to rest with individuals, as well as governments,
to adequately prepare for hazards of all sorts. Individuals are expected to stockpile
food and other necessities, wash their hands, disinfect surfaces, and obtain
seasonal vaccinations. Voluntary compliance with public health orders—be they
for quarantine, isolation, school closures or a prohibition on social or religious

53. Ibid at 976.
54. See Joe Hermer & Janet E Mosher, eds, Disorderly People: Law and the Politics of Exclusion in
Ontario (Halifax: Fernwood, 2002); Patrick Parnaby, “Disaster through Dirty Windshields:
Law, Order and Toronto Squeegee Kids” (2003) 28:3 Can J Sociology 281.
55. See Kent Roach, “Did September 11 Change Everything? Struggling to Preserve Canadian
Values in the Face of Terrorism” (2002) 47:4 McGill LJ 893.
56. Sunstein, supra note 49 at 977.
57. Marilou Gagnon, Jean Daniel Jacob & Dave Holmes, “Governing through (in)security: A
critical analysis of a fear-based public health campaign” (2010) 20:2 Critical Pub Health 245
at 249.
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gatherings—is assumed to be a widely accepted norm and practice.58 As such,
resort to coercion is understood to be exceptional and thus, infringements on
rights rare. Moreover, given the emphasis on individual responsibility to prepare,
avoid, and comply, those who fail to take these precautionary measures are faulted
and blamed for their own neglect.59 Both the SARS and the H1N1 outbreaks
made clear that those without resources, such as a home in which to isolate
themselves, stockpiles of food, running water and soap for regular hand washing,
or access to trusted medical personnel, are less able to protect themselves. Their
ability to comply is structurally limited; they are unable, and presumptively not
unwilling, to comply. But their lack of compliance renders them more vulnerable
to the coercive arm of law.60
Volumes of historical evidence of pandemics tell us that those who are socially
marginalized bear the greatest burden in terms of disease acquisition, death,

58. See Public Health Agency of Canada, Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan for the Health
Sector, online: <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/cpip-pclcpi/>. The plan emphasizes personal
preparedness but does, in Annex O, detail a coordinating role for the Council of Emergency
Social Services Directors in organizing volunteers, distributing food, and creating temporary
shelters. The May 2009 editorial of The Lancet, issued in the midst of the H1N1, urges
readiness to self-isolate at home if flu-like symptoms appear (Lancet, supra note 1). Ontario
has produced a series of one page fact sheets about pandemic flu, these include: “Taking
Care of Yourself and Your Family: What to Do If You Get Pandemic Flu” (stay home, rest,
take a warm bath); “Preparing for a Pandemic Flu: Making Individual and Family Plans”
(including a series of questions to consider, such as what to do if your child’s daycare closes,
but provides no solutions); and “Staying Healthy During a Flu Pandemic” (the advice is to
eat well, drink lots of water, exercise regularly, stay home, wash your hands often, stay away
from people, and avoid public gatherings and crowds). Clearly, this advice presupposes access
to considerable resources; the overwhelming majority of these recommendations are simply
impossible for the homeless to implement. For fact sheets, see Ontario Ministry of Health
and Long-Term Care, Ministry Programs, Influenza Pandemic, online: <http://www.health.
gov.on.ca/en/public/programs/emu/pan_flu/pan_flu_materials.aspx#fs>.
59. A 2007 New York Academy of Medicine study concluded that “planners are developing
emergency instructions for people to follow without finding out whether it is actually possible
for them to do so or whether the instructions are even the most protective action for certain
groups of people to take.” Annas, Mariner & Parmet, Public Health, supra note 5 at 18. The
study further notes that the administration’s preference for market-based health care leaves
individuals to fend for themselves.
60. This is evident in the case of City of Newark v JS, 279 NJ Super 178, 652 A.2d 265 (1993)
(holding that illness alone does not permit confinement, but that a homeless person suffering
from active tuberculosis could be confined because other accommodations were insufficient).
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rights deprivations, and depletion of resources and assets.61 History also tells us,
repeatedly, that marginalized social groups—the poor, immigrants, particular
racialized groups—have been identified as vectors of disease, scapegoated,
blamed, cordoned off, and banished. The inculcation of fear of the homeless
and of squeegee workers used to justify Ontario’s Safe Streets Act,62 combined
with the fear of contagion and the absence of resources to protect themselves,
may render homeless people scapegoats during the next pandemic. These are
the “foreigners”—the internal and external enemies63—who, as outlined in
Canada’s National Security policy, pose a threat to national security and who
must therefore be contained and neutralized. The willingness to curtail rights
arises not only from flawed perceptions of risk, but as Toope reminds us, from an
implicit assumption “that ‘we’ are giving up somebody else’s rights for a perceived
improvement in our security.”64
C. THE PROMISE OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

As noted at the outset, in response to concern over the violation of individual rights
in the name of public health (reinscribed as national security), the availability of
judicial review of public health orders is proffered as a means to guard against

61. See for example Felice Batlan, “Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and
Quarantines Past and Future” (2007) 80:1 Temple L Rev 53. Mariner, Annas, and Parmet
conclude that “[m]easures like quarantine, surveillance, and behavior control have historically
been targeted at people who are already disadvantaged, those on the margins of society,
especially immigrants, the poor, and people of color” (Mariner, Annas & Parmet, “Rule of
Law,” supra note 2 at 358-59). Gostin & Berkman express concern that “governments would
use social distancing in a discriminatory fashion, scapegoating ethnic or religious minorities,
or using social distancing to pretextually crack down on dissidents who assemble to protest”
(Gostin & Berkman, supra note 1 at 165). And Mariner, Annas & Parmet remind us that:
Highly discriminatory and forcible vaccination and quarantine measures adopted in
response to outbreaks of the plague and smallpox over the past century have consistently
accelerated rather than slowed the spread of disease, while fomenting public distrust and,
in some cases, riots.
The lessons from history should be kept in mind whenever we are told by
government officials that “tough,” liberty-limiting actions are needed to protect us from
dangerous diseases.
Annas, Mariner & Parmet, Public Health, supra note 5 at 5-6.

62. SO 1999, c 8.
63. See also Rita Dhamoon & Yasmmen Abu-Laban “Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and
Nation-Building: The Case of Canada” (2009) 30:2 Int’l Pol Sci Rev 163.
64. Toope, supra note 4 at 295.
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abuses of power and to ensure the proper balance is struck between individual
rights and “the right of the public to be protected against infectious disease.”65
The Campbell Commission, in its Final Report, Spring of Fear, identified a host
of “glaring deficiencies in Ontario’s health protection and emergency response
laws.”66 Many of these glaring deficiencies relate to failings in procedural justice,
where “confusion and uncertainty are the only common threads throughout the
legal procedures now provided by the Health Protection and Promotion Act for
public health enforcement and remedies.”67
For the person seeking to challenge a section 22 order, a fifteen day period
to file a written notice, and a further fifteen day period during which the Board
must hold a hearing, creates the absurd result that the time period of the original
order may well have expired. For example, during the SARS period, quarantine
was usually for a ten day period, so the period of containment and restricted
mobility would in all likelihood have expired before an order was subject to
review.68 The Campbell Commission also notes the further delay caused by an
appeal to the Divisional Court, a leave application, and a further appeal to the
Court of Appeal. As such, most rights violations—if subject to review at all—
will occur only after the period of isolation, quarantine, or treatment has been
completed. The response of the Coalition of Muslim Organizations to Canada’s
anti-terrorism legislation captures well the unsatisfactory nature of an ex post
review:

65. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 335.
66. Government of Ontario, SARS Commission, Final Report: Volume 2, Spring of Fear (Toronto:
Queen’s Printer, 2006) at 3, online: < http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/
publications/reports/campbell06/campbell06.aspx>
67. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 9. In addition to the powers reviewed above there
are separate powers to make orders and to enforce them for occupational and environmental
hazards (HPPA, supra note 22, s 13) and where the Chief Minister of Health needs to act in
the face of a health risk (ibid, s 86).
68. During the SARS period, between fifteen thousand to twenty thousand people with
epidemiologic exposure to SARS were instructed to remain in “voluntary” quarantine,
meaning they were to remain in their homes, avoid having visitors, wash their hands
frequently, wear masks in the same room with other household members, avoid sharing
personal items, sleep in separate rooms, and measure their temperature twice daily. Some
health care workers were on “work quarantine” and permitted to travel only between their
homes and the health care facilities where they were employed. In total, only twenty-seven
section 22 orders were issued during the SARS period. While many characterize the
quarantines during SARS as voluntary (apart from these few instances where orders were
issued), others question this characterization given that non-compliance would lead quickly
to the issuance of an order.
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The adverse impacts of this Bill [C36] will not be remedied by judicial oversight
and post-facto vindication. Stern judicial sanctions of the State’s violation of rights
make great case law …[ .] However, case law will not put together ruined families,
regain lost livelihoods, or rebuild friendships and trust, which were fractured by
the suspicion, innuendo, and stigmatization sown by the overly zealous acts of the
State.69

Moreover, the restriction of appeals of section 35 orders to the Court of
Appeal to questions of law alone, and then only with “special leave” is deeply
troubling in light of the real possibility, canvassed above, that the evidentiary
threshold for resorting to coercive measures may be driven more by fear and
political expediency than by science.70
Further procedural challenges relate to the opportunity for those who
are the subject of orders to participate in the processes for review. Given the
short timeframes for action and the nature of the rights in issue—security of
the person, autonomy, and liberty—and the complexity of the legal regime, it
is hard to imagine effective participation without access to counsel. For those
without resources to hire counsel, rapid access to state-funded legal counsel will
be critical, but nowhere is this assured.
Moreover, a further quandary identified by the Campbell Commission in
its work is that of respecting the participatory rights of those subject to orders,
while simultaneously preventing the “court process from becoming a vector of
infection.”71 The need to protect the health and safety of court staff may well
require specific procedural modifications, such as the ability to conduct hearings
via videoconference. A related, but broader, concern is the potential closing
of courts; as a Florida bench guide concludes, “[i]f the courts fail to open or
to function for any reason, the revered concept of ‘access to justice’ becomes
meaningless. To ensure that access to justice is, in fact, a reality, it is essential
to make sure that the courts have in place deliberately – designed strategies for
addressing potential court-closing emergencies of all kinds.”72 But as the Florida
bench guide and others have acknowledged, in the context of a serious pandemic,
access to meaningful procedures may simply be non-existent.
69. Coalition of Muslim Organizations, “Brief to Standing Committee on Justice and Human
Rights on Bill C-36” (8 November 2001), cited in Roach, supra note 55 at 913.
70. The Campbell Commission describes this as a restriction of access to justice of a person
whose rights have been significantly infringed. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 332.
71. Ibid at 352.
72. Florida Court Education Council, Pandemic Influenza Benchguide: Legal Issues Concerning
Quarantine and Isolation, 2007 ed, at 4, online: <http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/
courted/bin/pandemic_benchguide.pdf>.
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The need for clarity and speed for all concerned leads the Campbell Commission
to recommend the creation of a single, simple, codified, self-contained, and
complete set of procedures in the Superior Court. As envisioned it would include
special procedures, such as ex parte applications for interim and temporary orders,
and video and audio hearings.73 Significantly, consistent with recommendations
of the Commission, the HPPA has been amended to enhance the powers of
Medical Officers of Health, to allow for the mandatory surrender of premises for
use during an outbreak, to facilitate the sharing among state officials of personal
health information, to obligate doctors and nurses to report a patient with a
communicable disease who refuses or neglects to continue with treatment, and
to expand the police services vested with powers to enforce section 35 orders, yet
virtually none of the recommendations of the Commission for procedural reform
has been adopted in Ontario.74 The legislative reforms implemented during the
unfolding of the SARS outbreak—the expansion of places of detention beyond
hospitals to include other “appropriate facilities,” and the ability to issue orders
against a class—remained unchanged, notwithstanding the Commission’s
recommendation that, with regard to class orders, the legislation be changed to
require reasonable efforts be made to consult with the class prior to the issuance
of an order.75
As such, we are left in Ontario with a regime in which a person—or indeed
an entire class of persons—can be ordered detained and medically examined
without consent, and required to take steps to avoid exposing other people to
infection, including through quarantine. Beyond this, where the communicable
disease is categorized as virulent, persons can be detained for treatment, absent
consent, for six months at a time. Notwithstanding these significant infringements
of rights to security of the person, liberty, and autonomy, the procedures to
challenge such orders are woefully inadequate; they remain the “confusing maze
of overlapping and uncertain judicial powers and procedures best described as a
legal nightmare.”76
This brings us to what is perhaps the crux of the matter: where persons
who either have or potentially have a communicable disease are cast as a threat
to the public (rather than respected members of that public), and where fear
is cultivated, the ‘necessary’ transgression of individual rights becomes all too

73. The Campbell Commission also makes a broad range of additional recommendations
regarding the HPPA that speak to employment protections and the conditions of detention,
which I review in further detail below.
74. HPPA ss 26, 29.2, 35(6), 77.6, 77.9.
75. Ibid, ss 5.0.1-5.0.5, s 35(3).
76. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 337.
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readily accepted. Given the dominant narrative propelling this account, the
outcome of the “delicate task of balancing individual rights against the right of
the public to be protected against infectious disease”77 identified by the Campbell
Commission, or the justifiable derogation of rights envisioned by the ICCPR
and Siracusa Principles, may be already largely predetermined. Mariner, Annas,
and Parmet identify the edict that we must “trade liberty for security”78 as the
signature phrase—or we might say, the central moral lesson—of the national
security approach to pandemic planning. The approach implores us to take for
granted (or assume that “all Canadians know” and accept) the imperative to trade
individual rights for national security.79 Fear is promoted and safety is promised in
return; the violation of individual rights is a collateral, but necessary, outcome.80
While we could craft procedures that are more appropriate and responsive,
provide timely notice and quick access to hearings, fund access to counsel,
delineate clearer evidentiary standards, and undertake other measures to better
safeguard individuals rights—steps the Campbell Commission suggests we
should take—these measures are unlikely to make a substantial difference for
marginalized groups or to the health of the population.81 Indeed, that the Ontario
government has failed to act on the recommendations of the Commission for
procedural reform is a disturbing signal that those whose rights will be at stake
are not worthy of protection. Just as we ought to be skeptical of claims that
national security is attained by limiting the rights of those suspected of terrorism,
so too should we be skeptical of the claim that public health is protected by the
limitation of the rights of those who have (or may have) acquired a communicable

77. Ibid at 335.
78. Mariner, Annas & Parmet, “Rule of Law,” supra note 2 at 354. In the Canadian context
Toope asserts that a culture of rights is being replaced by a culture of security (supra note 4 at
283).
79. Annas, Mariner, and Parmet persuasively argue that “the notion that we must “trade
liberty for security” is both false and dangerous”; false because “coercive actions are seldom
conducive to public health protection” and dangerous “because it provides a never-ending
justification for the suppression of civil liberties while failing to safeguard public health”
(Annas, Mariner & Parmet, Public Health, supra note 5 at 8).
80. See George J Annas, “Puppy Love: Bioterrorism, Civil Rights, and Public Health” (2003)
55:5 Fla L Rev 1171 at 1173. More pointedly Annas argues that the approach can be
described as “scare them to death and then take power” (ibid at 1175).
81. Parmet expresses a similar concern about the limitations of judicial review and the inability
of existing legal and ethical frameworks to secure human rights (Parmet, “Public Health &
Social Control,” supra note 47). And many have expressed the broader worry that the culture
of security threatens human rights. See e.g. Toope, supra note 4. Toope, however, is more
optimistic about the potential of the courts.
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disease.82 Rather, a fundamental reorientation is required, one that moves beyond
a narrow focus on individual autonomy, brings social context and marginalized
populations fully into the foreground, and prioritizes public health preparedness.

II. SECURING PUBLIC HEALTH
Rather than accepting the catastrophic events of 9/11 as the backdrop and impetus
for its framework, a consideration of past pandemics and the current social
context is the starting point in this alternative conception. As noted briefly above
in the Introduction and Part I.B, history reveals that the burdens of pandemics—
indeed of virtually all forms of disasters—have not been borne equally; those who
are the most socially and economically disadvantaged have suffered the greatest
burdens, their interests largely disregarded.83 Of the 62 million deaths projected
for the next major influenza pandemic, it is estimated that 96 per cent will be in
low- and middle-income areas (both nationally and globally).84 In Canada, the
H1N1 pandemic in 2009 had a disproportionate impact on Canada’s aboriginal
population: 25.6 per cent of those hospitalized were of Aboriginal ancestry,
although they comprise only 4 per cent of the Canadian population.85 During the
influenza pandemic of 1918-1919 the death rate among Aboriginal peoples was

82. See Roach, supra note 55; David M Paciocco, “Constitutional Casualties of September 11:
Limiting the Legacy of The Anti-Terrorism Act” (2002) 16 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 185; Patrick J
Smith, “Anti-Terrorism and Rights in Canada: Policy Discourse on the ‘Delicate Balance’”
(2003) 25:2 Arab Studies Quarterly 137.
83. Harvey Kayman and Angela Ablorh-Odjidja note that in the “absence of social, political, and
economic equality, racial and ethnic minorities and individuals of low socioeconomic status
are left extremely vulnerable to every threat that may become apparent.” Harvey Kayman &
Angela Ablorh-Odjidja “Revisiting Public Health Preparedness: Incorporating Social Justice
Principles In Pandemic Preparedness Planning for Influenza” (2006) 12:4 J Pub Health
Mgmt & Prac 373 at 376.
84. Lancet, supra note 1.
85. Donna Atkinson, “Health Inequities in First Nations Communities and Canada’s Response
to the H1N1 Influenza Pandemic” in Joint Centre for Bioethics, Population and Public
Health Ethics: Cases from Research, Policy, and Practice (Toronto: Canadian Institute for
Health Research, 2012); Kevin Patterson, “Influenza has a cure: affluence” Globe and
Mail (4 September 2009), online: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/science/
influenza-has-a-cure-affluence/article4195391/> (documenting the impact of epidemics
(including H1N1) on Canada’s First Nations communities and concluding that “the main
reason native people die of infections, at rates that would be inconceivable and entirely
unacceptable to other Canadians, is because they are poor”).
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five times that of the non-Aboriginal population.86 In the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina in 2005, it was clear that income differentials, which in New Orleans
were heavily correlated with race, led to significantly disparate outcomes.87 It is
worth underscoring that these burdens include not only death but also serious
illness, depletion of resources, forced separation, restrictions on movement,
and stigmatization.
These disparate outcomes can be traced to the social processes that construct
disadvantage, marginalization, and exclusion.88 They are shaped, as Tierney
suggests, by the “same dimensions of stratification and inequality that influence
people’s lives during non-disaster times,” such as wealth, poverty, age, race,
ethnicity, gender, and disability.89 Inadequate shelter and income, illiteracy, poor
health, food insecurity, and political marginalization all contribute to social
vulnerability. These factors, in turn, are connected to larger social and economic
structures and processes—for example, the lack of affordable housing, the
declining value of the minimum wage, the growth in precarious work, growing
income inequality, and discrimination.
Linking the differential impact of pandemics to patterns of systemic and
structural inequality repositions pandemics as problems not of national security
but of social injustice. Here, scholarship that frames public health generally as a
matter of social justice, and that calls for ethical frameworks that would displace
the primacy of individual autonomy, help to flesh out an alternative approach
to pandemic preparation.90 The identification of social determinants of health
has been central to the framing of public health as a matter of social justice.
This approach challenges the narrow framing of the dominant bio-medical view
86. Thomas Appleyard, Bridging the preparedness divide: A framework for health equity in Ontario’s
Emergency Management Programs (Toronto: Wellesley Institute, 2009) at 9, online: < http://
www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/ori5qc0m.pdf>.
87. See Jonathan Purtle, “Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Post-Disaster Mental Health:
Examining the Evidence through a Lens of Social Justice” (2012) 19:1 Wash & Lee J CR &
Soc Just 31; Kayman & Ablorh-Odjidja, supra note 83.
88. See Canadian Red Cross, “Integrating Emergency Management and High-Risk Populations:
Survey Report and Action Recommendations” (19 December 2007) at 10-13, online <http://
www.redcross.ca/cmslib/general/dm_high_risk_populations.pdf >. See also AM Viens,
“Disadvantage, Social Justice and Paternalism” (2013) 6:1 Public Health Ethics 28.
89. Kathleen Tierney, “Social Inequality, Hazards, and Disasters” in Roland J Daniels, Donald
F Kettl & Howard Kunreuther, eds, On Risk and Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) 109 at 110.
90. See the literature on social justice approaches to public health, for example Kayman &
Ablorh-Odjidja, supra note 83; Purtle, supra note 87; Lawrence O Gostin & Madison
Powers, “What Does Social Justice Require for the Public’s Health? Public Health Ethics And
Policy Imperatives” (2006) 25:4 Health Affairs 1053.

944

(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

by underscoring the importance of access to adequate housing, income, food
security, and social networks, along with the absence of discrimination and
social exclusion, in maintaining health.91 Cast as a “health equity” approach, it
seeks to redress “differences in health outcomes that are avoidable, unfair and
systematically related to social inequality and disadvantage.”92 Significant here is
the shift from the physical body and medical expertise as the loci of health, to the
impact on health of the social, economic, and political context.
The dominant approach to ethics in health care is principlism. Grounded
in the clinical relationship between doctor and patient, and rooted in liberal
individualism, this approach emphasizes respect for autonomy, beneficence,
non-maleficence, and justice as its guiding ethical values.93 Principlism’s focus
upon the individual and its prioritization of autonomy lead, not surprisingly, to
identification of the potential infringement of privacy, liberty, and security of the
person through quarantine, isolation, and forced treatment as one of the pressing
ethical issues posed by pandemic planning. In their critique of principlism,
Baylis, Kenny, and Sherwin advance a particularly insightful conceptualization
of relational autonomy and social justice.94 Liberal conceptions of autonomy
presuppose persons as self-made and self-governing. Relational autonomy,
by contrast, understands persons to be constituted by and through social
relations, and their ability to self-govern to be shaped by social structures. Social
position or location—race, gender, socio-economic status, immigration status,
for example—places people differently in their access to and ability to benefit
from social structures and resources. This interface reflects and reinforces the
distribution of social disadvantage and privilege, including access to health and
well-being. As such, our framework of public health ethics needs to be expanded
beyond the doctor-patient relationship to take into account the manner in which
social structures, systems and policies create options and the means to secure
health for some, but not others.
As Baylis, Kenny, and Sherwin suggest, this approach to public health moves
beyond a conception of distributive justice as the fair distribution of benefits and
91. See Juha Mikkonen and Dennis Raphael, Social Determinants of Health: The Canadian Facts
(Toronto: York University School of Health Policy and Management, 2010) online: <http://
www.thecanadianfacts.org/>.
92. Appleyard, supra note 86 at 3.
93. Francoise Baylis, Nuala P Kenny & Susan Sherwin, “A Relational Account of Public Health
Ethics” (2008) 1:3 Public Health Ethics 196; Cara M Cheyette, “Communitarianism and
the Ethics of Communicable Disease: Some Preliminary Thoughts” (2011) 39:4 JL Med &
Ethics 678.
94. Baylis, Kenny & Sherwin, supra note 93.
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burdens, to a conception of social justice. Social justice, in contrast to distributive
justice, draws attention to how membership in social groups creates disadvantage.
It stretches the conceptualization of benefits and burdens to include not only
material resources but also participation, power, and self-respect. This offers, in
turn, an alternative framework for the conceptualization of pandemic planning.
A. VOICE AND PARTICIPATION

The political exclusion of marginalized social groups has meant that their distinct
circumstances and needs have been largely invisible within pandemic and other
disaster management plans. Of the 37 national pandemic plans (including
Canada’s) reviewed by Uscher-Pines et al, only ten plans identified groups whose
members might be socially disadvantaged or have special needs, and not a single
plan systematically identified and addressed the needs of disadvantaged groups.
Only one plan identified a need for temporary housing for disadvantaged groups,
and discussion of the impact of social distancing measures such as school closures
on families dependent upon the food their children receive at school were rarely
identified. None mentioned the broader issue of the need to ensure access to
food and water or addressed the disproportionate impact of the loss of income
on those who are already socially disadvantaged.95
Based on surveys of voluntary and emergency management organizations,
the Canadian Red Cross concluded that significant gaps exist in emergency
management plans at the federal, provincial, and territorial levels in addressing
the needs of marginalized populations, with the needs of women, transient
populations, and new immigrants/cultural minorities the least likely to be
considered.96 Importantly, workers in the voluntary sector expressed little
confidence that the needs of such populations would be addressed during
a disaster.97 A 2010 Canadian survey of public health staff regarding the
responsiveness of plans to “marginalized urban populations” came to a similar
conclusion: community groups have not been engaged early enough in planning
and as a result, plans are too generic in nature, with inadequate attention to

95. Lori Uscher-Pines et al, “Planning for an Influenza Pandemic: Social Justice and
Disadvantaged Groups” (2007) 37:4 Hastings Center Report 32 at 35-36.
96. Canadian Red Cross, supra note 88 at 30.
97. Ibid at 41.
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the needs of marginalized groups.98 Street nurse Cathy Crowe captures the
consequences for the homeless of these gaps within pandemic plans:
When SARS hit Toronto it was evident within weeks that shelters and drop-ins and
all the people in them would have to fend for themselves. The City’s best plan in the
event that homeless people were exposed to SARS included a proposed ‘lockdown’
of Seaton House—the largest men’s shelter in Canada—and ‘home’ quarantine in
the same shelter. No plans for proper quarantine facilities. No plans for drop-in
centres. No plans to stop the night-by-night movement of people who are homeless
and forced to use the volunteer based Out of the Cold emergency shelter sector. This
lack of planning would have made it impossible to contain the outbreak should
SARS have entered this population.99

Redressing the invisibility of the distinct needs of marginalized groups
and the often misplaced assumptions underlying existing plans requires the
active participation and collaboration of marginalized groups in the planning
process.100 Collaboration is essential to the creation of plans that move beyond
an undifferentiated ‘public,’ that are attentive to the distinct needs, expectations
and perceptions of marginalized groups, and that ensure “equal protection and

98. International Centre for Infectious Disease, Issues in Pandemic Influenza Responses for
Marginalized Urban Populations: Key Findings for Marginalized Urban Populations (March
2010) online: <http://www.icid.com/files/Marg_Pop_Influenza/Issues_in_Pandemic_
Influenza_Responses_for_Marginalized_Ubran_Populations_English_FINAL.pdf>. The
survey was sent to 288 public health staff and 96 responses were received. Massey et al
similarly conclude that the comprehensive plans developed by most countries neglect
the needs of marginalized populations. In particular, they note the failure to include the
Indigenous people of Australian in a respectful partnership. While the Australian plan
recognizes the increased risk for Indigenous people, it does not adequately attend to the
specific context of their lives, including profound social inequality, poor access to health
care, and institutionalized racism. They urge a respectful and genuine partnership, grounded
in respect for human rights, and they warn that “the consequences of inflexibly enforcing a
non-Indigenous model of containment will be dire.” PD Massey et al, “Pandemic influenza
containment and the cultural and social context of Indigenous communities” (2009) 9 Rural
and Remote Health 1179.
99. Canadian Red Cross, supra note 88 at 15 [emphasis in original]. As SARS unfolded in
Toronto, the city struggled to find a quarantine site for homeless people, eventually settling
on one floor of an existing shelter. Leung et al report that efforts were “hampered by the
limited availability of suitable facilities and concerns regarding negative reactions from the
community near such a facility” (supra note 8 at 408).
100. The central importance of community engagement, and in particular of disadvantaged
communities is advocated by, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union (Annas,
Mariner & Parmet, Public Health, supra note 5) and the Canadian Red Cross (supra note 88).
See also George L Saunders & Thea Monet, “Eliminating Injustice Toward Disadvantaged
Populations During an Influenza Pandemic” (2007) 68:1 North Carolina Medical J 46.
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quality of services during a pandemic … regardless of social difference.”101 Such
engagement also enables those involved in the planning process to understand
and consider local knowledge, skills, and networks, all of which will be critical
in a pandemic.102
The Bellagio Principles, derived during a meeting of public health
practitioners to discuss social justice and pandemics, echo this imperative.103
These principles would require explicit identification of disadvantaged groups,
their engagement in the planning process, identification of the distinct needs of
diverse disadvantaged groups in the context of a pandemic, and concrete plans
to meet those needs.
Engaged conversation and collaboration in pandemic planning are also
vehicles for building trust. Many of those who experience profound social
marginalization have experienced repeated betrayals of trust, including by state
actors. They have little reason to trust that the state will act in their interest. This
distrust will, of course, not be mended through a few conversations. Rather, it
requires ongoing and sustained opportunities for those who experience social
vulnerability to participate, not only in conversations about pandemic planning,
but in a vast array of areas of legal and social regulation.
B. RECALIBRATING THE RESPONSIBILITY MIX

Pandemic planning invariably entails decision-making regarding the allocation
of responsibility for action not only between differing levels of government, but
as between the state, community-based organizations, and individuals. As noted
above in Part I.B, current pandemic plans allocate significant responsibility to
individuals to be personally prepared and to voluntarily comply with the advice,
directives, or orders of state agents; people are expected to stockpile food, shelter
or quarantine themselves in their homes, and faithfully practice germ elimination
methods.104 These expectations are premised upon a number of assumptions
regarding the capacity of individuals, which as the Wellesley Institute concludes
in relation to Canada’s federal plan and its campaign for personal preparedness,
may be “unrealistic, unfair and inequitable.”105 Surveys and interviews conducted

101. Kayman & Ablorh-Odjidja, supra note 83.
102. Canadian Red Cross, supra note 88 at 23.
103. Bellagio Meeting on Social Justice and Influenza, “Bellagio Statement of Principles” (2006),
online: <http://www.unicef.org/avianflu/files/Bellagio_Statement.pdf>.
104. See note 58, above, for particulars of the expectations regarding personal preparedness.
105. Appleyard, supra note 86 at 13.
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with homeless individuals in Toronto after the H1N1 pandemic revealed just
how unrealistic and unfair these expectations often are.
Between October 2010 and April 2011, 149 homeless individuals in Toronto
completed a detailed survey and participated in a structured interview covering
matters such as general health, access to shelter, food, and water, and the use of
services, including emergency shelters for drop-ins. The interviews also included
questions specifically focused upon the two waves of the H1N1 pandemic in the
spring and fall of 2009, exploring such issues as access to reliable information,
vaccines and health care.106 Among the sample, 64.4 per cent identified as
male, 30.2 per cent as female, and 2.7 per cent as transgendered; 45 per cent
were street-involved youth (age 24 and under), and 24.8 per cent identified as
Aboriginal or First Nations. Ninety-six per cent of those in the sample reported
being homeless during the H1N1 pandemic. The homeless individuals who
participated in the study reported heavy reliance on shelters (59 per cent used
shelters between once per month and most of the time, a percentage that rose
to 62.4 per cent during the H1N1 pandemic) and drop-in centres to meet basic
needs (48.3 per cent reported accessing these every day, 18.1 per cent more than
twice per week, and 71.8 per cent during the H1N1 pandemic). Not only do
they not have access to a private sphere over which they can exercise control,
they are forced to survive within a homelessness infrastructure in which they
frequently sleep and eat in over-crowded conditions (for example, 33.7 per cent
reported in the survey sleeping in overcrowded conditions once a week or more
often) and where constant mobility is necessary to meet basic needs (travelling
to drop-ins, engaging in street-level subsistence activities, seeking protection
from the elements).107 Social distancing measures designed to limit the spread
of contagious disease are fundamentally at odds with the structures, institutions,
and routines necessary to access food, shelter, and support. The ability to
106. The survey and interviews were components of the two CIHR funded projects mentioned
in the acknowledgements at the outset, Responding to H1N1 in the Context of Homelessness
in Canada and Understanding Pandemic Preparedness within the Context of the Canadian
Homelessness Crisis. In addition to the surveys and interviews with homeless individuals,
service providers and key informants were also interviewed in four Canadian cities:
Toronto, Regina, Calgary and Victoria. For the only published work from the projects
focuses specifically on access to vaccines to date, see Kristy Buccieri & Stephen Gaetz,
“Ethical Vaccine Distribution Planning for Pandemic Influenza: Prioritizing Homeless and
Hard-to-Reach Populations” (2013) 6:2 Pub Health Ethics 185. The discussion in the text
draws from a data analysis of the surveys and interviews of homeless individuals in Toronto
prepared by Kristy Buccieri (on file with the author).
107. I draw here from the survey and interview data of the Toronto portion of the empirical
research described at the outset of this article.
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practice recommended germ elimination methods—regular hand washing and
disinfecting surfaces—is similarly constrained.
The concept of relational autonomy helps us to see that social structures
and processes create limited, and in some circumstances virtually non-existent,
options. Rather than blaming individuals for their ‘failure’ to self-protect, or to
comply with public health orders, we need to consider what forms of state action
are required to enable compliance. The Campbell Commission provides insight
into possibilities of this sort. After a lengthy review of quarantine measures,
including compliance data, the Commission recommended legislative reforms
that would provide a range of employment protections and a “basic blueprint
for the most predictable types of compensation” that would be provided.108 The
importance of enabling compliance was borne out during the H1N1 pandemic
in the United States, where a major determinant of compliance with social
distancing measures was the presence of employer-paid sick-leave.109
The Campbell Commission’s analysis also underscores the reciprocity
that is essential to an effective pandemic response: governments cannot expect
compliance with measures such as quarantine without a reciprocal obligation
to ensure the provision of safe shelter and access to adequate food, water, and
other necessities, and to provide job security and adequate compensation.110
The Commission concludes that “[a]ny fight against infectious disease
depends above all on public cooperation. … [which] must be nurtured and
promoted,”111 adding that “legal powers by themselves are false hopes.”112 It
continues: “Voluntary compliance is the bedrock of any emergency response.
It is essential to compensate those who suffer an unfair burden of personal cost
for cooperating in public health measures like quarantine.”113 Further, “without

108. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 9.
109. Purtle, supra note 87 at 42-43, where he also references one study estimating that “disparities
in paid sick leave policies contributed to an additional 1.2 million cases of probably H1N1
among Hispanics.”
110. Gostin & Berkman, supra note 1 at 174 also emphasize the ethical obligation of society to
provide those affected with the necessities of life, including safe and humane housing, high
quality medical care, and psychological support.
111. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 8.
112. Ibid at 11.
113. Ibid.
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public cooperation, laws are little help … . Legal procedures are useless without
overwhelming public cooperation … .”114
But here again the advice of the Commission has been largely ignored.
Ontario’s Employment Standards Act provides for a leave of absence, but the
leave is unpaid.115 Moreover, eligibility arises only after an emergency has been
declared and the employee has been made the subject of an order under the
Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act116 or the HPPA, or is required
to care for a close relative (as listed in the statute) who is the subject of such an
order. This is woefully inadequate because it ignores the impact of lost income on
low-wage earners and telescopes our obligation of care to a narrow circle of
close relatives, omitting the friends, neighbours, and colleagues who may well
require assistance in the time of a pandemic. Complete silence surrounds future
compensation plans.
C. ACCESSING TRUSTED INFORMATION

Access to timely and relevant communication from a trusted source has been
identified as absolutely critical by the Campbell Commission and by many others
who think about pandemic planning. Gostin and Berkman have noted that while
misinformation has been rampant during past pandemics, the most marginalized
members of society have experienced the least access to credible and reliable
sources of information.117 Differences in culture, language, reasoning processes,
and literacy all point to the importance of tailored and targeted communications.118
But unless those with varied needs participate in the planning and development
114. Ibid at 298, 300. While here the Campbell Commission emphasized that compliance derives
from a sense of civic duty rather than a fear of legal consequences, later in its report the
Commission expresses a view that “[e]ducation and moral suasion ... will not bring results
unless the people realize that behind them is the long arm of the Law” (ibid at 298).
115. SO 2000, c 41, s 50.1. In some instances, other forms of unpaid leave, such as the family
medical leave (ibid, 49.1), the family caregiver leave (ibid, 49.3) and the personal emergency
leave (ibid, 50(1)), may be available.
116. RSO 1990, c E-9.
117. Gostin & Berkman, supra note 1 at 162.
118. Elaine Vaughan & Timothy Tinker, “Effective Health Risk Communication About
Pandemic Influenza for Vulnerable Populations” (2009) 99 Am J Pub Health 324.
Here again, the experience of the Ebola virus in West Africa is instructive; not only has
the absence of trust in state actors presented a major barrier to containing its spread,
but so too has the failure to consider cultural practices in burying the dead (in which
the deceased’s body is touched). See Arinjay Banerjee et al, “Vulnerability, hysteria
and fear – conquering Ebola virus” (2014) 201:6 Med J Aus 320 at 320-21; Celine
Gounder, “To combat Ebola, first build back trust in healthcare workers” The Great
Debate (30 July 2014), online: < http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/07/30/
efforts-against-ebola-outbreak-hampered-by-victims-lack-of-trust-in-healthcare-workers/>.
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of the content of communications and communication strategies, a nuanced
appreciation of those differences will not emerge, and communications during
a pandemic will be massively uneven, with potentially devastating implications.
Additionally, the importance of a trusted source of information cannot be
under-estimated. Indeed the Campbell Commission identified public confidence
that medical decisions are being made by a trusted independent medical leader
as “the most important thing in a public health emergency.”119 But do we know
whom different populations rely upon and trust for information? The Toronto
study of homeless individuals specifically asked about who they trusted to provide
public health information during the outbreak of H1N1. Health care providers
were ranked as the source of the best information about H1N1, followed by the
television, shelter and drop-in centre staff, posters and pamphlets, and family
members. Community health clinics were the most common point of access
to health care for those interviewed (36.9 per cent report using community
health centres, while 30.9 per cent reported having a regular doctor, 24.8 per
cent utilized walk-in clinics, and 22.8 per cent used the health services offered
through shelters and drop-in centres). Gathering this type of more finely
grained information is critical to developing responses that are attentive to the
needs of particular groups, and ultimately to our ability to minimize the impact
of a pandemic.
D. ACCESSING VACCINES

There is widespread agreement that in a pandemic there will be not be an adequate
supply of vaccines or anti-viral medications, raising important questions about
allocative criteria. Much of the literature here—medical and ethical—focuses
on medical vulnerability and the importance of preserving the health of first
responders and health care workers.120 Again, a shift in focus to a social justice
model challenges these widely agreed-upon priorities.121 Viewed through the lens
of social vulnerability, the issues of crowded living quarters, inadequate food,
119. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 13 [emphasis added].
120. The Government of Canada identifies several priority groups (although they are not rank
ordered); none of the groups are derived from a social vulnerability analysis. Public Health
Agency of Canada, supra note 58.
121. Tracey O’Sullivan & Maxime Bourgoin, “Vulnerability in an Influenza Pandemic:
Looking Beyond Medical Risk” (Ottawa: Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010), online:
<http://cdn.metricmarketing.ca/www.icid.com/files/Marg_Pop_Influenza/Lit_Review_-_
Vulnerability_in_Pandemic_EN.pdf>. See also Hillary R Ahle, “Anticipating Pandemic Avian
Influenza: Why the Federal and State Preparedness Plans are for the Birds” (2007) 10:2 De
Paul J Health Care L 213.
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and poor ventilation become relevant to the determination of priority access.
As the Toronto surveys and interviews reveal, homeless individuals experience
significant social vulnerability: they report high levels of poor health (33.6 per
cent described their overall health as fair, 7.4 per cent as poor/bad, and 3.4 per cent
as very poor/bad). More particularly, 21.5 per cent reported chronic lung disease,
58.75 per cent fatigue, 43.6 per cent depression, and 47.5 per cent a disability.
This combination of poor health, inadequate nutrition, overcrowding, and, in
many shelters, poor ventilation, renders the homeless particularly vulnerable to
the acquisition of communicable disease. While a medical lens of vulnerability
may identify some of the homeless for priority access, a consideration of social
vulnerability would shift significantly more resources towards the homeless
population.122
A consideration of social vulnerability not only expands the range of ethical
considerations necessary to deliberations about prioritization but also requires
that we consider the more pragmatic logistical challenges of ensuring access to
vaccines for marginalized groups. During the H1N1 pandemic, for example, a
concerted effort to create accessible, community-based vaccination clinics for the
homeless was undertaken through a partnership between Toronto Public Health
and shelters, drop-in centres, and community-based health centres. This effort
resulted in a sizeable increase in homeless people’s vaccination rates for H1N1
compared to seasonal flu, from an average of 25 per cent for the seasonal flu
vaccine to 38 per cent for the H1N1 vaccine as reported by participants in the
Toronto study (a rate similar to that of the general population).123

122. Gostin & Berkman note that the criteria frequently employed to determine access
prioritization protect relatively high-income earners—those who produce vaccines,
first responders, medical personnel—and utterly fail to attend to those who are socially
disadvantaged (Gostin & Berkman, supra note 1 at 136-39). There are profoundly important
issues related to the global access to vaccines and anti-virals; for example, during the 2009
H1N1 pandemic, developed countries bought virtually all the vaccines that companies
could manufacture. See David P Fidler, “Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza Vaccines:
Global Health Diplomacy and the Controversies Surrounding Avian Influenza H5N1
and Pandemic Influenza H1N1” (2010) 7:5 PLOS Medicine 1, online: <http://www.
plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000247>. See also
Buccieri & Gaetz, supra note 106; Mark A Rothstein, “Should Health Care Providers Get
Treatment Priority in an Influenza Pandemic?” (2010) 38:2 JL Med & Ethics 412; Carl H
Coleman, “Allocating Vaccines and Antiviral Medications During an Influenza Pandemic”
(2009) 39:4 Seton Hall L Rev 1111.
123. Buccieri & Gaetz, supra note 106 at 191.
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E.

PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION

Stereotypes of the poor, the homeless, Aboriginal people, racialized peoples,
and people with disabilities are pervasive and contribute to the discrimination
that limits access to meaningful employment, to education, and to political
participation. As noted above, there is considerable evidence from past pandemics
and other disasters that these events exacerbate discrimination.124 Particular
groups have been identified as sources of contagion, scapegoated, demeaned, and
disrespected. Pandemic planning informed by social justice requires, as Keil and
Ali have argued, planning how to avoid the “identification of infection with race,
ethnicity or other socio-physical appearance,” and to develop “safeguards against
racist victimization of infected people and those who are targeted as potential
risk groups.”125 As the Campbell Commission cautioned regarding orders
against a class of persons, it is “all too easy for officials with lesser sensitivity to
act immediately, without consultation, and to think only later of the ensuing
stigmatization, disruption, and confrontation.”126

124. Selgelid reminds us that “infectious diseases are prone to promote fear, panic, stigma,
discrimination, and emotional and irrational decision and policy making” (supra note 10 at
255).
125. Roger Keil & Harris Ali, “Multiculturalism, Racism and Infectious Disease in the Global
City: The Experience of the 2003 SARS Outbreak in Toronto” 16 Topia 23 at 25. Similarly
the American Civil Liberties Union suggests that a governing principle must be the
protection of minorities and the socially disadvantaged from discrimination (Annas, Mariner
& Parmet, Public Health, supra note 5). Gostin & Berkman similarly address concerns
regarding the discriminatory use of social distancing, quarantine, and isolation (supra note 1).
126. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 320-21. To guard against this, the Commission
recommended that “the power to order and enforce isolation of a group must, wherever
practicable, be preceded by such degree of consultation with the group as is feasible in the
circumstances” (ibid at 321).
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III. CONCLUSION
The evidence to date suggests that the voices of those who are socially marginalized,
including the homeless, have been largely silenced in the pandemic planning
process. They have not been identified as requiring priority access to treatment
or vaccinations, notwithstanding their vulnerability to communicable diseases,
their need to travel to access basic necessities, and their lack of access to resources
required to take measures to protect themselves. The recommendations of the
Campbell Commission regarding the obligations of the state to guarantee safe
shelter, food, and water, and to be absolutely clear about available compensation,
have been ignored. Social vulnerability finds no place in the national security
narrative that reduces individuals to risks, dehumanizing them in the process.
Against the dominant narrative of national security, the social justice
approach to planning struggles for a place. There are, however, signs of change.
There is a growth in scholarship that engages social justice in public health
generally, and in pandemic planning more specifically. O’Sullivan and Bourgoin,
in a recent review of the pandemic literature, discern a shift from a focus on
medical vulnerability to social vulnerability.127 Ontario’s Pandemic Influenza Plan
for the Health Sector has recently been updated to incorporate “health equity”
as a defining principle, promising a strategy that “strives to reduce or eliminate
socially structured differentials in health outcomes, building on broader ideas
about fairness, social justice and civil society,” and noting that:
For example, the implementation of system-wide school closures has different
impacts on groups in society such as single parents/caregivers, children who
participate in school-based nutrition programs, families with low or fixed incomes
who cannot afford increased child care costs, and parents who do not have flexible
work arrangements, paid vacation or short term leave policies.128

Equity principles have not, however, moved into action and there are
worrying trends in the opposite direction.
Income inequality continues to grow in Canada. The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ranks Canada as one
of the developed countries with the worst income gap.129 After close to three
127. O’Sullivan & Bourgoin, supra note 121.
128. Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, “Ontario Health Plan for an Influenza Pandemic”
(2013) at 8, online: <http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/pro/programs/emb/pan_flu/docs/
ch_04.pdf>.
129. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, “Divided We Stand: Why
Inequality Keeps Rising” (2011), online: <http://www.oecd.org/canada/49177689.pdf>.
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decades of neo-liberal reforms, Banting and Myles describe Canada as a “fading
redistributive state” wherein the tax transfer system no longer offsets the growth
in inequality generated by the market, and where ideational shifts have replaced
equality with efficiency.130 In this context of growing inequality, how ought we to
think about legal preparedness?
As former Chief Justice Roy McMurtry urged in the context of anti-terrorism
measures, no doubt there is a role for law and for lawyers to “uphold the rights
of the individual in the face of increased security concerns.”131 As outlined above,
a number of obstacles impede access to an adjudicative forum to review orders
made under the HPPA, and procedural reforms would go at least some distance
in protecting the rights of individuals to liberty, privacy, and security of the
person in the context of a pandemic. But that distance, in light of the power of
the national security narrative, will be very short indeed.
Beyond these measures there is a role for law and lawyers in advancing
the social justice approach to pandemic planning. Here the emphasis is upon
creating positive state obligations, rather than keeping the state out of the lives of
its subjects. Such obligations range from those tied to an actual pandemic—the
creation of enforceable employment protections, guaranteed compensation
packages, the right to safe quarantine or isolation facilities and to food and
water—to more expansive and longer-term measures designed to diminish social
inequality. Securing a right to health—not to health care but to health with all
that entails in relation to its social determinants—will be our best protection
against a pandemic. As legal professionals, our efforts cannot be confined to the
contestation of particular and specific deployments of state power to detain,
contain, and treat. In isolating justice concerns to this narrow band of activity,
the social and participatory domains of justice are ignored.
Baylis, Kenny and Sherwin suggest that the threat of a pandemic has created
a “window of opportunity” to think creatively about “an ethics framework
that is firmly grounded in our common interest in preventing illness, building
physically and socially healthy communities and eliminating health inequities.”132
Perhaps equally so, it presents an opportunity for us to rethink the necessary
legal framework, one constructed with the full participation of those traditionally
excluded and marginalized.

130. Keith Banting & John Myles, Inequality and the Fading of Redistributive Politics (Vancouver,
BC: UBC Press, 2013).
131. Toope, supra note 4 at 295.
132. Baylis, Kenny & Sherwin, supra note 93 at 196.

